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INTERNATIONAL LAW 
IN RE MEXICO CITY AIRCRASH: PRIVATE RIGHTS OF 
ACTION UNDER THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT AND 
THE WARSAW CONVENTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Ninth Circuit held in In re Mexico City Aircrash/ that 
persons qualifying as "passengers" may bring an action for 
wrongful deathS under the Warsaw Convention.3 
In 1979, a Western Airlines jetliner crash landed at the 
Mexico City Airport killing seventy-four persons aboard the 
plane.· Western employees Theresa Haley, Regina Tovar, and 
Vikki Dzidall were among the victims. Haley and Tovar were on 
duty as flight attendants8 and Dzida was en route to her sched-
uled assignment on another flight departing from Mexico City.7 
Representatives of the three decedents sued Western Air-
1. 708 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Fletcher J., the other panel members were 
Pregerson, J., and Reinhardt, J.). . 
2. It is imperative to have a statutory or treaty basis in which to ground a wrongful 
death suit because the traditional common law rule in the United States recognized no 
cause of action for wrongful death. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 127 (1971). 
3. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, October 12, 1929, (as adopted by the U.S. at 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 
876) [hereinafter cited as the Warsaw Convention]. Although the United States was not 
a party to the Warsaw Conference, the Department of State sent observers to the pro-
ceedings. On April 17, 1934, President Roosevelt transmitted the Warsaw Convention to 
the Senate. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Convention 
for the Unification of Certain Rules, S. EXEC. Doc. No. G, 73d cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934). 
The United States Senate gave its consent to the Convention on June 15, 1934 and it 
became law. The Convention has since been revised by the Hague Protocol in 1955, the 
Guadalajara Convention in 1961, the Guatemala Protocol in 1971, and, most recently, the 
four Additional Montreal Protocols in 1975. See generally Pogust, The Warsaw Conven-
tion - Does It Create a Cause of Action?, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 366, 366 n.2, (1978). 
4, 708 F.2d at 403. 
5.Id. 
6. Id. During the flight Haley and Tovar received full pay and full flight time credit. 
7. Id. Dzida, while flying to her scheduled assignment received 100% of normal 
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lines and other defendants8 claiming damages for death and loss 
of property.9 Western moved to dismiss the suitslO alleging that 
the decedents, as Western employees, were provided with an ex-
clusive remedy under the California worker's compensation 
statute.ll 
Plaintiffs opposed the motionll based on the California dual 
capacity doctrine,13 the Federal Aviation Act14 and the Warsaw 
Convention. III 
The district court granted Western's motion to dismiss, 
holding that all three decedents were acting within the course 
and scope of their employment at the time of the crash, and that 
the. plaintiffs were limited to the exclusive remedies of the Cali-
fornia Labor Code.18 
Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit contending that 
genuine issues of material fact were presented with respect to 
their causes of action, and that dismissal of their claims was 
erroneous. 17 
8. The other defendants included: McDonnell Douglas Co., Inc.; Estate of Charles 
Gilbert; Sperry-Rand, Inc.; Sunstrand Data Control, Inc.; Bendix Corporation, Flight 
Systems Division; Rockwell International, Inc.; Collins Air Transport Division; and, 
Thompson, C.F.S. 1d. at 400. 
9. 708 F .2d at 403. 
10. The district court's judgment did not indicate whether the dismissals were for 
failure to state a claim pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)6 or for summary judgment 
under FED. R. CIV. P. 5(B)a. The judgments were based on Western's affidavits. There-
fore, the Ninth Circuit interpreted them as summary judgments. 708 F.2d at 404 n.3. 
11. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3201-3213 (West 1976). 
12. Plaintiff Dzida also opposed the motion to dismiss on the ground that his dece-
dent was not aboard the flight in her capacity as a Western employee and, therefore, was 
not limited to a worker's compensation remedy. 708 F.2d at 403. 
13. Under this doctrine, an employer may become liable in tort if in addition to his 
capacity as employer there is a second capacity which confers on him obligations inde-
pendent of those imposed as employer. Douglas v. E & J Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 
103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977). 
14. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1976). 
15. See supra note 3. 
16. See supra note 11. 
17. 708 F.2d at 402. 
2
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B. BACKGROUND 
1. The Federal Aviation Act 
The Federal Aviation Act18 governs civil aviation within the 
jurisdiction of the United States. Although the general intent of 
the Act is to promote the safety of air travelers,19 the Act does 
not expressly create a private right of action for persons injured 
as a result of violations of the Act.20 
Although the Ninth Circuit has never directly determined 
whether a private right of action may be implied from safety 
provisions of the Act,lll the court in Sanz v. Renton Aviation, 
Inc.,iI held that the personal representatives of decedents killed 
in an air crash could not maintain a cause of action under the 
ActlS against the owner-lessor for the negligence of the pilot-
lessee.14 The court reasoned that extending liability to the own-
er-lessor would have little impact on the Act's underlying policy 
of safety,211 and noted that if Congress had intended to create a 
civil remedy, one would have been expressly provided for in the 
Act. 18 
In World Airways, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters,27 the Ninth Circuit held that the authority of a labor 
arbitrator to shape a remedy in a pilot dispute was limited by 
18. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552. 
19. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1432 (1976 Supp. IV 1980). These provisions confer extensive 
powers upon the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe standards and regulations re-
garding nUlllerous aspects of civil aviation for the purpose of promoting safety. Pursuant 
to this subchapter the secretary has promulgated comprehensive rules and guidelines 
published in Volume 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 
20. No intent is explicitly manifested in the Act's legislative history. 708 F.2d at 
406. 
21. [d. at 405. 
22. 511 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1975). In Sanz, the personal representatives of persons 
killed in a light plane crash sued the agency from which the plane was rented. Plaintiffs 
asserted that the pilot was not competent to fly and that his deficiencies could have been 
discovered through greater diligence on the part of the rental company's agents. 
23. 511 F.2d at 1029. 




27. 578 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1978). This case was an appeal from a district court judg-
ment which vacated part of an arbitration award. The award required World Airways, 
Inc. to retrain and then provide an opportunity to requalify a pilot who had been de-
moted for repeated errors in judgment. 
3
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the policy of the Federal Aviation Act.1l8 The court refused to 
imply a private right of action based on provisions of the Act 
unrelated to safety.29 
Other circuits similarily have concluded that no right of ac-
tion may be implied from the Act's· safety related provisions.30 
Additionally, a number of circuits have refused to find a private 
right of action based on provisions of the Act unrelated to 
safety.31 The majority of recent district court decisions that have 
examined whether private rights of action can be implied from 
the safety and non-safety related provisions of the Act have also 
held that no such right exists.82 
The district court decisions holding that a private right of 
action can be implied from the Federal Aviation Act have relied 
on the Act's savings clause.s8 However, in Middlesex County v. 
28. Id. at 801. 
29. The court stated that Congress had directed the Administrator of the Federal 
Aviation Administration to ensure air carriers performed their services with the highest 
degree of safety. Id. at 803. The court noted that "failure of an airline to comply with the 
provisions of the. . . Act and its regulations. . . can result in. . . civil penalties against 
the carrier." Id. In Mexico City Aircrash, the Ninth Circuit stated that this language 
does not suggest that the Federal Aviation Act contains a private right of action. 708 
F.2d at 406. 
30. For example, in Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 548 F.2d 452, 457-58 (3d Cir. 
1976), that court found no private right of action for potential air crash victims. How-
ever, the court did not explicitly decide whether actual victims of air disasters may main-
tain a '<8use of action. 
31. In Diefenthal v. C.A.B., 681 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, _ U.S. _ 
(1983), the court held that no private right of action existed under the Federal Aviation 
Act whereby passengers could sue the carrier for failing to provide seats for plaintiff in 
the smoking section of the aircraft. In Kodish v. United Airlines Inc., 628 F.2d 1301 
(10th Cir. 1950) an unsuccessful applicant for a pilot position was denied a cause of 
action for age discrimination under the Federal Aviation Act. 
32. The majority view states it is improper to infer a private right of action from the 
Federal Aviation Act. In Obenshain v. Halliday, 504 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Va. 1980), the 
court held that the representative of a passenger killed in an airplane crash due to the 
failure of runway lights had no wrongful death cause of action based on the Federal 
Aviation Act. See also Heckel v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 467 F. Supp. 278 (W.D. Pa. 1979); 
Yelinek v. Worlev, 284 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Va. 1968); Moungey v. Brandt, 250 F. Supp. 
445 (W.D. Wis. 1966). 
33. The minority view is represented by Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350F. Supp. 
612 (C.D. Cal. 1972) and In re Paris Aircrash, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975). In 
Gabel, the court concluded that the representatives of decedents killed in an air crash 
could maintain a cause of action against the common carrier. 350 F. Supp. at 612. The 
holding was based on the congressional emphasis on safety found throughout the Act. Id. 
at 617. However, the court also relied on the savings clause, incorporated in the Act, in 
making its decision. The court stated that the wrongs prohibited in the Act's safety re-
4
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National Sea Clammers Association,s. the Supreme Court re-
versed a lower court's holding which found an implied right of 
action based on a savings clause, found in a federal regulatory 
statute. SG The Court held that the lower court incorrectly relied 
on the savings clause in finding a cause of action, because the 
main emphasis of the Act was an administrative regulation and 
enforcement. S6 
In Cort v. Ash,S? the United States Supreme Court devel-
oped a four step analysis to be used in determining when a cause 
of action may be implied from a federal regulatory statute. The 
Cort analysis inquires whether: (1) the plaintiff is a part of the 
class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) there is an 
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit,' either to cre-
ate or deny such a remedy; (3) it is consistent with the underly-
ing purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy; 
and (4) the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state 
law, in an area basically the concern of the states, so that it 
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on 
federal law. S8 Lower courts presently employ the Cort analysis to 
determine whether a private remedy can be implied from a fed-
lated provisions are cumulative with respect to state remedies. Id. The savings clause 
states that "nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the reme-
dies now existing at common law or by statute, but . . . are in addition to such reme-
dies." 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1976). Congress has never expanded on the meaning of this 
section. See H.R. REP. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2a Sess. 18-19, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 3741, 3758; H.R. REP. No. 2254, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 11-12 (1938). In 
Paris Air Crash, a passenger airplane taking off from Paris, France, crashed in France, 
and killed all the passengers and employees on board the aircraft: Two hundred and 
three suits, arising from the air crash, were filed in the Federal District Court for the 
Central District of California. The major claim alleged in the suits was for strict product 
liability against General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas. The court concluded that 
there was a clearly articulated federal right to enforce a cause of action for wrongful 
death arising from operation of an unsafe aircraft. 399 F. Supp. at 748. 
34. 453 U.S. 1 (1981). Plaintiffs brought suit in the district court, against officials 
from New York and New Jersey alleging damage to the fishing grounds. Plaintiffs alleged 
the damage was caused by ocean dumping of sewage. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and 
declaratory relief and compensatory and punitive damages. 
35. Id. at 11. 
36. Id. at 15-17. 
37. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort, a stockholder brought suit seeking damages in favor 
of Bethlehem Steel Corporation and for injunctive relief. The claim was in connection 
with advertisements made during the 1972 Presidential election which were paid for 
from the general corporate funds. Plaintiff alleged this violated federal law which prohib-
its corporations from making contributions in specified federal elections. 
38. Id. at 78. 
5
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eral regulatory statute.39 
2. The Warsaw Convention 
The Warsaw Convention was drafted with the intent of cre-
ating a uniform body of law to govern the liability of air carriers 
in international air transportation.40 The legislative history of 
the Convention indicates that the drafters did not directly ad-
dress the issue of whether the treaty creates a cause of action for 
personal injury or wrongful death.41 
However, Article 17 of the Convention provides in part that 
the carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of 
death, wounding, or bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the 
accident causing the injury took place on board the aircraft.42 
This section has been construed to create a cause of action for 
both wrongful death and personal injury,,3 
In Choy v. Pan-American Airways CO.,44 a claim for wrong-
ful death based on the Warsaw Convention was disallowed,, 11 
. The district court held that the treaty was not enforceable in the 
United States without an enabling act either creating a cause of 
39. See, In Re Paris Aircrash, supra note 33. See generally, Crawford & Schneider, 
The Implied Private Cause of Action and the Federal Aviation Act: A Practical Appli-
cation of Cort v. Ash, 23 ILL. L. REV. 657 (1978). 
40. The Convention's preamble states that the signatories "have recognized the ad-
vantage of regulating in a uniform manner the conditions of international transportation 
by air." 49 Stat. 3014, T.S. No. 876 (1934) (unofficial translation). The need to establish 
uniform rules resulted in the First International Conference on Private Aeronautical Law 
at Paris in 1952. The delegates at Paris established the Comite International Technique 
d'Experts Juridique Aeriens (CITEJA), a committee assigned the task of drafting inter-
. national agreements regarding international air law. After debate whether a cause of ac-
tion could be created through an international convention, CITEJA decided that a ear-
rier would be liable for damages due to wrongful death or physical injury. In addition, 
any actions for liability against a carrier were required to be based on CITEJA rules. 
The Warsaw delegates accepted the CITEJA draft as their source document. After eight 
days of debate the draft took its final form as the Warsaw Convention. See Pogust, 
supra note 3 at 366-67. 
41. The issue of a cause of action for damages was, however, discussed in general 
terms.Id. 
42. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. XVII. 
43. Salamon v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij, N.V., 107 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. 
Ct. 1951) aff'd mem., 281 A.D. 965, 120 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1953). 
44. 1941 A.M.C. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). In Choy, plaintiff, as administrator of dece-
dent's estate, sued for the wrongful death of a passenger killed in the crash of a seaplane 
which was crossing the Pacific Ocean. 
45. Id. at 487-488. 
6
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action or naming those who could sue for a passenger's death.48 
However, in Salamon v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maat-
schappij, N. V.,.' the court reached the opposite result.48 The 
court held that the Convention created a cause of action, and 
that the plaintiff could sue for the wrongful death of her de-
ceased spouse based on Article 17.49 The court reasoned that if 
the convention did not create a cause of action in Article 17, it 
would be difficult to understand the reasons for Article 17's 
existence.llo 
In Kamlos v, Compagnie National~ Air France,lIl the court 
rejected the Salamon conclusion,1I2 based on the text of a letter 
from Secretary of State Cordell Hull to President Roosevelt 
describing the Convention. Hull's letter stated that Article 17 
created only a presumption of liability against the aerial carrier 
upon the happening of an accident.1I3 The court concluded that 
the law of the forum supplied the only possible cause of action 
since one was not provided for in the Convention.1I4 
In Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana,1I11 the Second Cir~ 
46. [d. at 488. In Wyman v. Pan-American Airways, Inc., 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 
420 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 267 A.D. 947,48 N.Y.S.2d 459, aff'd, 293 N.Y. 878, 59 N.E.2d 
785 (1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 882 (1945), the court followed the Choy holding. The 
court did not elaborate with any further rationale for declining to find a cause of action 
in the Convention. The court stated that the Convention did not create new substantive 
rights, but operated within the framework of existing rights and remedies. 
47. See supra note 43. 
48. [d. at 770-71. 
49. [d. 
50. [d. at 773. 
51. 111F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 
1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 820 (1954). 
52. 111 F. Supp. at 401-02. 
53. The letter was important because it was a summary of the Convention's provi-
sions based on the reports of U.S. observers, present at the proceedings. Secretary Hull 
wrote: 
"The effect of Article 17 . . . of the Convention is to create a 
presumption of liability against the aerial carrier on the mere 
happening of an accident occasioning injury or death of a pas-
senger subject to certain defenses allowed under the Conven-
tion to the aerial carrier." 
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules, S. EXEC. Doc. No. G, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1934), re-
printed in 1934 U.S. Av. 239, 243-44. 
54. 111 F. Supp. at 402. 
55. 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957). Noel involved an action 
7
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cuit followed Kamlos, and held that the Convention did not cre-
ate a cause of action for wrongful death. ~6 Twenty-one years 
later, the Second Circuit, in Benjamins v. British European Air-
ways,~'1 reversed its decision in Noel. In reversing the Noel deci-
sion, the court noted that the overriding goal of the Convention 
was to formulate a uniform set of rules governing international 
air transportation.~8 Thus, it was inconsistent with the spirit of 
the treaty to require a plaintiff to find an independent domestic 
cause of action. ~9 
In making its decision, the court relied on the First Circuit's 
opinion in Seth v. British Overseas Airways Corp.,60 and Article 
30(3) of the Convention.61 In Seth, the court held that Article 
30(3) created a cause of action for the loss, damage, or delay of 
baggage during carriage by successive air carriers.62 Although the 
language of Article 30(3) and Article 17 substantially differed, 
the court reasoned that if a cause of action was created under 
Article 30(3), the intent of the drafters was to create a cause of 
action throughout the Act, including Article 17.63 
The Second Circuit also noted that Great Britain was the 
only other Warsaw signatory which had a common law rule 
against wrongful death recovery.6' Shortly after the Conven-
tion's ratification, the treaty was incorporated into Britain's na-
tionallaws.6~ By including supplemental provisions,66 a wrongful 
death cause of action was created in Article 17. The Benjamins 
by the executors of decedent's estate against a corporation owned by the United States 
of Venezuela for damages for wrongful death. The decedent was killed in an air crash in 
the Atlantic Ocean 30 miles from New Jersey. 
56. Id. at 680. 
57. 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979). 
58. Id. at 917-918. 
59.Id. 
60. 329 F.2d 302 (1st Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 858 (1964). In Seth, passen-
gers sued British Overseas Airways Corporation for loss of baggage. 
61. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. XXX(iii). Article XXX(iii) states: 
"As regards baggage or goods, the passenger or consignor who is entitled to delivery shall 
have a right of action against the last carrier .... " 
62. 329 F.2d at 305. 
63.Id. 
64. 572 F.2d at 918-19. 
65. This was done through the Carriage by Air Act, 1932. 22 & 23 Geo. 5, ch. 36, 
reprinted in C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, AIR LAW 681-92 app. 2 (2d ed. 1951). 
66. See Provisions as to Liability of Carrier in the Event of the Death of a Passen-
ger 22 & 23 Geo. 5, ch. 36, sched. 2 (1932). [d. at 692. 
8
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court reasoned that the British implementation scheme raised 
the inference that the British delegates to the Convention be-
lieved Article 17 created its own cause of action.67 In light of 
Britain's apparent treatment of Article 17, the court concluded 
that the provision should be construed similarly to create a 
cause of action in the United StateS.68 
3. California's Worker's Compensation Law 
The California Worker's Compensation ActS9 is a compul-
sory statute70 establishing an exclusive system of compensation 
for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. 7~ 
Under certain circumstances, Federal law will override the state 
statute and provide the remedy for recovery.72 For example, in 
Smith u. Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd.,78 the Second Circuit 
noted that because the Warsaw Convention is a treaty, and is 
the supreme law of the land it preempted local worker's com-
. pensation law.7• 
The worker's compensation law also may be inapplicable 
where an employee is acting outside the scope of employment at 
the time of the injury. In Demanes v. United Air Lines,75 per-
sonal representatives sued United for the death of four pilots 
who were killed in an air crash while commuting between Los 
Angeles and Denver.7s The court held that the pilots' represent-
atives were not limited to a worker's compensation remedy be-
cause the pilots were passengers for the purposes of liability 
when the accident occurred." The fact that the pilots were com-
muting was critical to the determination that they were not act-
ing as employees.78 
67. 572 F.2d at 918-19. 
68.Id. 
69. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3201-3213 (West 1976). 
70. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3700 (West 1976). 
71. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West 1976). 
72. Article VI of the United States Constitution provides that the laws of the 
United States and all treaties made under the authority of the United States shall be the 
supreme law of the land. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
73. 452 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1971). 
74. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
75. 348 F. Supp. 13 (C.D. Cal. 1972). 
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C. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit used the four part test articulated in 
Cort79 to determine that the Federal Aviation Act contains no 
implied private right of action.80 Considering the first inquiry, 
whether the plaintiffs were part of the class for whose benefit 
the statute was enacted,81 the court stated the legislation was 
enacted to promote safety in aviation and to protect persons 
traveling aboard aircraft.811 This purpose was effectuated by re-
quiring the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe minimum 
standards for the design and operation of aircraft.83 The court 
79. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
80. 708 F.2d at 408. 
81. [d. at 406. 
82. [d. 
83. The minimum standards provided for by the Act are found in 49 U.S.C. § 1421. 
It provides in relevant part: 
Minimum standards; rules and regulations 
(a) The Administrator is empowered and it shall be his duty 
to promote safety of flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by 
prescribing and revising from time to time: 
(1) Such minimum standards governing the design, 
materials, workmanship, construction, and performance 
of aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellers as may be 
required in the interest of safety; 
(2) Such minimum standards governing appliances as 
may be required in the interest of safety; 
(3) Reasonable rules and regulations and minimum 
standards governing, in the interest of safety, (a) the in-
spection, servicing and overhaul of aircraft, aircraft en-
gines, propellers, and appliances; (b) the equipment and 
facilities for such inspection, servicing, and overhaul; 
and (c) in the discretion of the Administrator, the peri-
ods for, and the manner in which such inspection, ser-
vicing, and overhaul shall be made including provision 
for examinations and reports by properly qualified pri-
vate persons whose examinations or reports the Secre-
tary of Transportation may accept in lieu of those made 
by its officers and employees; 
.(4) Reasonable rules and regulations governing the re-
serve supply of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, ap-
pliances, and aircraft fuel and oil, required in the inter-
est of safety, including the reserve supply of aircraft 
fuel and oil which shall be carried in flight; 
(5) Reasonable rules and regulations governing, in the 
interest of safety, the maximum hours or periods of ser-
vice of airmen, and other employees, of air carriers; and 
(6) Such reasonable rules and regulations or minimum 
standards, governing other practices, methods, and pro-
cedure, as the Administrator may find necessary to pro-
10
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reasoned that since Congress intended to protect everyone trav-
eling aboard the aircraft, the decedents could not be excluded 
from the protected class simply because they were employees.84 
Accordingly, the court determined the first element of the Cort 
test was fulfilled.811 
The court, in applying the second requirement of Cort, in-
quired into the legislative history to determine whether or not 
Congress intended to create a remedy for damages. Noting that 
. the emphasis of the Act was on administrative regulation and 
enforcement,86 the court found no evidence of congressional in-
tent to create a .remedy for damages.87 The court followed the 
basic rule of statutory construction which disallows implication 
of other remedies where a statute expressly provides for a par-
ticular remedy. 88 
The Court, citing the Supreme Court decision in Middlesex, 
rejected the plaintiff's contention that a private right of action 
was created by the presence of the savings clause incorporated 
in the Act.89 The Act's emphasis on administrative regulation 
and enforcement,90 in combination with the absence of legisla- . 
tive intent to create a private right of action, led the court to 
determine that the second and most significant element of the 
Cort test was not satisfied.91 Because this element failed, the 
court found it unnecessary to examine the remaining Cort fac-
tors and concluded the Act contained no implied private right of 
action. 
[d. 
In the second part of its analysis92 the court inquired 
vide adequately for national security and safety in air 
commerce. 
84. 708 F.2d at 406. 
85. [d . 
. 86. [d at 407. 
87. [d. 
88. [d. at 407. 
89. 708 F.2d at 407. 
90. The court found that the Federal Aviation Act created an extensive statutory 
enforcement scheme allowing civil penalties to be levied for violations of the Act. The 
statute also authorized the Secretary of Transportation to seek injunctive relief to com-
pel compliance. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1471, 1487 (1976). 
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whether the Wars8w Convention created only a uniform set of 
legal rules to govern international air transportation, or also cre-
ated a right to recover for injuries or death based on Article 17.98 
The Ninth Circuit, relying upon the reasoning of Benjamins,94 
concluded that persons qualifying as "passengers" within the 
meaning of the treaty can recover for injuries or death based on 
Article 17.9& 
According to the court, the language of Article 17 stating 
that "the carrier shall be liable"96 demonstrates that the Con-
vention drafters intended to create a cause of action for injured 
or killed passengers.97 The court determined that it was unlikely 
the language was intended to create only a presumption of lia-
bility to be employed solely in actions available under domestic 
law.98 The court reasoned that since a statute of limitations pro-
vision was incorporated in Article 2999 of the Convention, a right 
of action was necessarily established subject to the limitation pe-
riod. loo The court stated that if the drafters of the Convention 
intended that only domestic law be the source of a plaintiff's 
action, it would not have incorporated such a provision.lol The 
court also pointed out that the language of Article 29 speaks of 
"the right of damages," implying that a cause of action is cre-
93. [d. at 409. 
94. 572 F.2d 913. 
95. The Ninth Circuit had never examined the Benjamins holding prior to Mexico 
City Aircrash. However, in Dunn v. Trans World Airways, Inc., 589 F.2d 408, 411-12 (9th 
Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit noted that the Benjamins rule contradicts the previous 
. majority rule but it was not necessary for the court to determine whether Benjamins 
should be followed. 
96. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. XVII. 
97. 798 F.2d at 412. 
98. [d. 
99. Article XXIX states: "(1) The right to damages shall be extinguished if an ac-
tion is not brought within 2 years, reckoned from the date of arrival at the destination, 
or from the date on which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the date on which 
the transportation stopped." See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. XXIX. 
100. 708 F.2d at 412. 
101. The court also pointed to the official French text of the Convention. The first 
portion of article XXIX in the French text reads, "(1) 'action an responsabilite' doit etre 
intente, sous peine de decheance, dans Ie delai de deux ans .... 49 Stat. at 3007, T.S. 
NO. 86 at 8. The court stated that a literal translation of this language would be, "[tlhe 
action for liability must be brought within two years, else it lapses." 708 F.2d at 412. The 
court said: "By speaking in this way of the action of liability and not merely in terms of 
an action for liability subject to the Convention, the article shows that the Convention 
creates cause of action." [d. 
12
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ated by the Convention. 102 
The court also examined Article 24,103 previously relied 
upon by courts to deny a cause of action under Article 17.104 The 
court interpreted the "without prejudice" language of the Article 
to be the result of uncertainty among the Convention delegates 
concerning the attributes of the right they created. 1011 The dele-
gates realized that several claimants might attempt to collect 
damages on behalf of a single dead passenger in different fo-
rums.10tl Therefore, the meaning of this provision was left inten-
tionally vague. The court interpreted this ambiguity to mean 
that eligibility for recovery on wrongful death was a question for 
the law of the forum; it was not to be viewed as evidence that 
the Convention did not create a cause of action. l07 The court 
stated that the only real question was whether the indefiniteness 
of Article 24, concerning the identity of persons entitled to re-
cover, precludes finding a right of action. l08 
The court citing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,t°9 
which overruled the traditional common law rule prohibiting 
wrongful death actions; except those with specific statutory au-
thorization,llo held that difficulty in ascertaining persons enti-
tled to recovery did not preclude finding of a cause of action for 
1'02. [d. 
103. Article XXIV states: 
(1) In the cases covered by Articles 18 and 19 any action for 
damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the 
conditions and limits set out in this Convention. (2) In the 
cases covered by Article 17 the provisions of the preceding 
paragraph shall also apply, without prejudice to the questions 
as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and 
what are their respective rights. 
Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. XXIV. 
104. See Pogust, supra note 3, at 373. 




109. 398 U.S. 375 (1970). In Moragne, the Court considered a situation where a 
longshoreman had been killed while working aboard a vessel within Florida territorial 
waters. Defendants moved to dismiss the case on the ground that federal statutory law 
provided no recovery for wrongful death in a state's territorial waters, and that Florida's 
wrongful death statute did not recognize unseaworthiness as a theory of recovery. The 
Court rejected this argument and held that a wrongful death action can be maintained 
under federal maritime law even without specific statutory authorization. [d. at 376. 
110. [d. at 388-92. . 
13
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wrongful death. III Therefore, a wrongful death action could be 
based on Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention although there is 
no specific statutory authorization to being such a suit. 
The court next considered whether the cause of action cre-
ated by the Convention was available to the plaintiffs. ll2 To al-
low recovery under Article 17, plaintiffs' decedents had to qual-
ifyas "passengers" within the meaning of the section. Plaintiffs 
argued that they qualified as passengers within the meaning of 
Article 17 because Article 1 makes the Convention applicable to 
persons receiving "gratuitous transportation."u3 
The panel held that the two flight attendants were not pas-
sengers within the meaning of Article 17.114 Their flights were 
not for the principal purpose of moving from one point to an-
other but for the exclusive purpose of performing their employ-
ment duties. 1111 Thus, the court held that the summary judg-
ments on the claims of the two flight attendants were proper.US 
The court reached a contrary conclusion in regard to the 
claim of Vikki Dzida's representative.1l7 Because Dzida was a 
Los Angeles based employee traveling to Mexico City to take 
duty aboard a plane departing from that location, the court held 
that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether or not 
she was receiving "transportation" as a "passenger" aboard that 
flight. U8 The court stated that the record was insufficient to 
show that Dzida was not, as a matter of law, a passenger aboard 
the airplane.119 The critical inquiry was whether Dzida was com-
muting or if she was contractually obligated to be on board the 
flight.120 The court stated that if she was in fact commuting, 
Ill. 708 F.2d at 415. 
112. 708 F.2d at 416 . 
. 113. [d. at 416-17. Article I states, in part: "(1) This Convention shall apply to all 
international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods performed by aircraft for hire. 
It shall apply equally to gratuitous transportation by aircraft performed by an air trans-
portation enterprise." Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 1. 
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then she probably qualified as a passenger.121 The summary 
judgment entered against Dzida therefore, was erroneous and 
was reversed. 122 
The court also considered Western's contention that any 
cause of action available to the plaintiffs under federal law was 
subordinate to California's worker's compensation remedy.123 
Western, citing King v. Pan American Airways124 and Stoddard 
o 
v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.,m, argued that the worker's com-
pensation remedy was the sole remedy available for the death of 
an employee acting in the course and scope of employment.126 
In rejecting Western's contention, the court noted that the 
holding in Demanes127 directly contradicted Western's argu-
ment. The court also distinguished both King and Stoddard 
from the present case, in that the former involved suits com-
menced under the Death on the High Seas By Wrongful Act, an 
Act which expressly provides that state statutes giving or regu-
lating any right of action are not affected by its provisions. 128 
The Warsaw Convention, which creates. a cause of action 
founded in federal treaty law, 129 contains no such provision. 
Therefore it preempts any provision of local law which purports 
to limit the recovery allowed by t~e Convention; 130 
D. CRITIQUE 
The Ninth Circuit, in Mexico City Aircrash, is the first cir-
cuit to directly examine the issue of whether or not the Federal 
Aviation Act contains· an implied right of action for wrongful 
death. In holding that no wrongful death cause of action may be 
implied from the Act, the court followed the general trend not to 
impute private remedies to federal regulatory statutes absent ev-




124. 270 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 928 (1960). 
125. 513 F. Supp. 314 (C.D. Cal. 1980). 
126. 708 F.2d at 418. 
127. 348 F. Supp. 13 (C.D. Cal. 1972). 
128. 46 U.S.C. § 767 (1976). 
129. 708 F.2d at 412. 
130. Id. at 418. 
131. See supra note 34. 
15
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Under the first part of the Cort analysis, the court properly 
recognized that both airline passengers and employees were part 
of the contemplated benefitted class of the legislation.132 The 
major emphasis of the Act is on safety. By applying minimum 
maintenance and operational standardsl33 the aircraft is made 
safer for both passengers and employees.134 
• In the second part of the Cort analysis,1311 the court correctly 
determined that there was no congressional intent to create a 
federal cause of action. Moreover, under Middlesex,136 the neces-
sary intent could not be implied from the Act's savings clause.13?' 
The focus of the Act is on administrative regulation and en-
forcement. 138 If Congress had intended to create a cause of ac-
tion, the intent would be manifested in the Act or its legislative 
history. In the absence of any explicit legislative authority it 
would be improper for the court to assume the legislative role of 
creating such a remedy.13B Absent compelling evidence of affirm-
ative congressional intent, a federal court should not infer a pri-
132. It is not disputed, even by those who argue against an implied cause of action 
from the Federal Aviation Act that passengers were to be the intended beneficiaries of 
this legislation. This conclusion is based on the extensive statutory scheme related to 
safety. Douglas, Air Disaster Litigation Without Diversity, 45 J. AIR. L. & COM. 411,447 
(1980). 
133. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1432 (1976). 
134. A plaintiff cannot even argue for an implied right of action unless he can iden-
tify a violation of the provisions of 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1976), or the regulations 
promulgated pursuant to the legislation dealing with safety. The plaintiff must also as-
sert the violation has caused the crash out of which the suit arises. See Douglas, supra 
note 132, at 447. 
135. This is the most important factor in the Cort analysis because it goes directly 
to the question of whether Congress intended to create a federal" cause of action. How-
ever, the other three factors are also helpful in answering the question. See Crawford 
and Schneider, supra note 39, at 674. 
136. 455 U.S. I, 9 (1981). 
137. 708 F.2d at 407. 
138. [d. 
139. There is evidence that members of Congress do not believe that any private 
right of action exists in the Act. In 1968 and 1969 Congress considered bills that would 
have created an exclusive federal private cause of action arising out of certain aircraft 
crashes. See generally, Note, Aircraft Crash Litigation, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1052 
(1970). However, "the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for infer-
ring the intent of an earlier one." Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980). 
Congress has never expanded on the meaning of the savings clause. However, in Oben-
shain v. Halliday, 504 F. Supp. 946, 950 (E.D. Va. 1980), the court stated that the section 
is not intended to create a private cause of action but simply to preserve state causes of 
action. 
16
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vate cause of action. 
The Ninth Circuit's determination that Article 17 created a 
private right of action is inappropriate because it ignores Con-
gress' intent to limit federal jurisdiction in Convention cases.140 
The court overreached its jurisdiction, as the decision en-
croaches upon the executive and legislative functions of the fed-
eral government to create and define the international laws to 
which the United States is bound.141 
Article 6, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution states 
that treaties made under the authority of the United States are 
the supreme law of the land.142 However, this clause has been 
interpreted to apply only to self-executing treaties which need 
no further act of Congress to be effective.143 Where some addi-
. tional act of Congress is necessary to give effect to the treaty, it 
is not operative.w Therefore, even if the Convention purported 
to create a cause of action, unless the provisions are self-execut-
ing, or' supplemen~ry legislation has been adopted, a cause of 
action would not be effective in the United States.1411 No statu-
tory cause of action based on the Warsaw Convention has been 
adopted by Congress.148 Therefore, in the absence of supplemen-
tary legislation, Article 17 must be self-executing in order to cre-
ate. a cause of action. 
Examination of Article 17 reveals that there is no provision 
providing for those entitled to bring suit.14? Additionally, as the 
rights provided by the Convention are contractual,148 and are 
personal to the passenger, legislation would be necessary for the 
right to survive a passenger's death.14s Article 17 has not been 
supplemented with this type of legislation. Therefore, the Arti-
cle is incomplete because it provides only for inchoate liability. 
140. See generally W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 166·91 (3d ed. 1971). 
141. Id. 
142. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
143. See Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). 
144. Id. 
145. See Pogust, supra note 3, at 371 n.34. 
146. Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit's reliance on Benjamins is inappropriate 
for four reasons. First, the Benjamins court did not fully deter-
mine whether Article 17 contains a self-executing provision. lIIO 
Although the language of Article 17 that "the carrier shall be 
liable," suggests an intent to create a cause of action, the Article 
fails to articulate the terms and conditions necessary to all,?w 
recovery. 1111 
Secondly, the Benjamins decision is unsupported since the 
Benjamins court's assertion that the Convention should be ap-
plied uniformlyllill is not compelled by the text of the treaty. illS 
For example, Article 21 provides that the law of the forum court 
determines whether the negligence of a passenger will reduce' his 
recovery by a degree comparable to his own fault. I 114 Under Arti-
cle 24, the determination of who possesses the right of action for 
wrongful death and the damages recoverable is also a question 
for federal law. m Article 22 limits a carrier's liability for the 
death or wounding of a passenger except where the carrier is 
guilty of willful misconduct.lCI6 Article 25 leaves the definition of 
willful misconduct to the law of the forum. 1CI7 
Thirdly, the interpretation of Sethlll8 in Benjamins is incor-
150. Under the traditional approach, a treaty is self-executing whenever its provi-
sions prescribe a rule by which rights of private citizens may be determined. Dreyfus v. 
Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976). A treaty may be 
self-executing if it was the intent of the drafters that its provisions be effective without 
further legislation. Comment, Criteria for Self-Executing Treaties, U. ILL. L.F. 238, 239-
40 (1968). 
151. It was first suggested in Komlos that Article XVII merely created a presump-
tion of liability that shifted the burden of proof and simplified the plaintiffs' recovery 
procedure. See supra note 57. 
152. The majority even recognized, " ... it is not literally inconsistent with [the 
principle of] universal applicability to insist that a would-be plaintiff first find an appro- . 
priate cause of action in the domestic law of a signatory .... " 572 F.2d at 917-18. 
153. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, arts. XXI (contributory negligence of 
passenger), XXIV(ii) (who has the right of action) XXV (standard by which carrier's 
willful misconduct is defined), XVIII(ii) (questions of procedure), XXIX(ii) (limitation 
of the time to sue). Two of these articles were not discussed by the Benjamins majority. 
154. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. XXI. 
155. [d. at art. XXIV. 
156. [d. at art. XXII. 
157. [d. at art. XXV. 
158. Seth had never been cited prior to the Benjamin decision. However, in a dis-
trict court decision in the same circuit as Seth, without citing Seth, the court held that 
federal question jurisdiction was inapplicable. Fabiano Shoe Co. v. Alitalia Airlines, 380 
F. Supp. 1400, 1403 (D. Mass. 1974). 
18
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recto The Second Circuit asserted that since Seth held that a 
cause of action is created under Article 30(3), the apparent pur-
pose of the drafters was to create a cause of action throughout 
the Convention. 1Ii9 In light of the conflicting language in Article 
30(3) and Article 17, and the varied subject matter in the two 
provisions, the Benjamins court's comparison is unwarranted. 
Unlike Article 17, Article 30(3) is the only provision in the Con-
vention which states when a passenger "shall have a right of 
action. "160 
Finally, the Benjamins court also misinterpreted the man-
ner in which Great Britain implemented the Warsaw Conven-
tion.161 The Second Circuit incorrectly assumed that the Con-
vention and the Carriage by Air Act of 1932162 included the same 
provisions.163 The Carriage by Air Act consisted of two ap-
pended schedules, the first containing the text of the Convention 
. and the second consisting of the wrongful death provisions. 1M 
The text of the Act indicates that only a presumption of liability 
arises from the Convention and that the provisions found in 
Schedule Two were necessary to create a cause of action for 
wrongful death. 166 
The C~rriage by Air Act of 1961/66 which replaces the 1932 
Act, conclusively demonstrates that Great Britain did not inter-
pret Article 17 to create a cause of action. The 1961 Act provides 
that the liability presumed in the Convention gives rise to a 
cause of action created by statute.167 The Benjamins majority, 
neglecting to examine adequately the Carriage by Air Act, 
reached the wrong conclusion. 
The Ninth Circuit, in addition to relying on the Benjamins 
reasoning, advanced further reasons why the decision should be 
159. 572 F.2d at 918. 
160. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. XXX(iii). 
161. 572 F.2d at 919. 
162. The Carriage by Air Act of 1932 22 & 23 Geo. 5, ch. 36, reprinted in, C. SHAW-
CROSS & K. BEAUMONT, AIR LAW 681-92 app. 2 (2d ed. 1951). 
163. 572 F.2d at 918-19. 
164. Provisions as to Liability of Carrier in the Event of the Death of a Passenger 22 
& 23 Geo. 5, ch. 36, sched. 2 (1932), reprinted in, AIR LAW, supra note 162. 
165. 1d. 




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984
180 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:161 
followed. The court deemed it unlikely that Article 17 created 
only a presumption of liability.188 However, in the letter from 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull to President Roosevelt describ-
ing the Convention, Hull stated that Article 17 creates only. a 
presumption of liability.189 The court insisted that the impor-
tance of this letter is outweighed by the Convention drafters re-
peated statements of the need for a uniform set of rules to gov-
ern international air transportation.170 Nevertheless, the 
Convention contains substantial concessions to national law in 
Articles 21, 22, 24 and 25,171 suggesting that the drafters in-
tended to defer to the wrongful death statutes existing in· the 
signatories' national laws. . 
The Ninth Circuit also incorrectly explained that Article 
24(2) was the result of uncertainty among the Convention dele-
gates regarding the attributes of the right they were creating.172 
The debates at the Rio Conference173 conclusively demonstrate 
that the Warsaw Convention was to apply to existing causes of 
action for wrongful death and not to create new ones.174 The Rio 
debates indicate that the Convention delegates did not intend to . 
interfere with wrongful death statutes existing at national law. m 
The Ninth Circuit attached great significance to the 
Moragne decision.178 In Moragne, the Supreme Court held that 
a wrongful death action can be maintained without specific stat-
utory authorization.177 However, Moragne could be used as au-
thority only if the Warsaw drafters had intended to create a 
cause of action in Article 17. From the reasons delineated above, 
it is apparent that no such intent existed. Therefore, the Con-
vention cannot be used as a reference point for the right the 
panel purports to create. 
168. 708 F.2d at 412. 
169. See supra note 53. 
170. 708 F.2d at 415-16. 
171. See supra notes 154-57. 
172. 708 F.2d at 414. 
173. See Pogust, supra note 3, at 377. 
174. [d. 
175. [d. 
176. 708 F.2d at 414. 
'177. 398 U.S. at 388-92. 
o 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Although the Ninth Circuit reached a sound conclusion re-
garding the Federal Aviation Act in Mexico City Aircrash, the 
court improperly concluded that Article 17 creates a private 
right of action. 
The court's reliance on the Benjamins decision is unjusti-
fied because of the distorted manner in which that court viewed 
the provisions of the treaty. The Ninth Circuit, like the Benja-
mins court, erroneously interpreted the intentions of the Con-
vention drafters. The court failed to adequately discuss the re-
cord of the Convention and its subsequent related conferences. 
The court's analysis disregards the importance of determining 
legislative intent through careful reasoned analysis. 
David J. McMahon* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1985. 
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